ALBERTA SECURITIES COMMISSION

DECISION

Citation: DeLaet, Re, 2013 ABASC 228 **Date: 20130527**

Victor George DeLaet and Stanley Kenneth Gitzel

Panel:	Glenda Campbell, QC Dan McKinley, FCA Stephen Murison
Representation:	Andrew Wilson for Commission Staff Victor George DeLaet for himself Stanley Kenneth Gitzel for himself
Submissions Completed:	10 May 2013
Date of Decision:	27 May 2013

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I. INTRODUCTION

[1] Victor George DeLaet (**DeLaet**) and Stanley Kenneth Gitzel (**Gitzel**; he and DeLaet together are the **Respondents**) contravened Alberta securities laws and acted contrary to the public interest by making, or authorizing, permitting or acquiescing in, misrepresentations. DeLaet also engaged in a course of conduct amounting to fraud. These findings are set out in the decision of this panel of the Alberta Securities Commission (the **Commission**) issued on 8 February 2013 and cited as *Re DeLaet*, 2013 ABASC 42 (the **Merits Decision**).

[2] For the second phase of this proceeding, the parties were invited to make submissions on the issue of what, if any, orders ought to be made against either or both Respondents. We received written submissions from all parties. We also accorded them an opportunity to supplement those submissions with oral submissions, an opportunity taken up by Gitzel (and Commission staff (**Staff**), in reply) but not by DeLaet.

[3] Having considered those submissions in light of our findings in the Merits Decision, we are ordering significant capital-market bans and administrative penalties, as well as costs, against each Respondent. The particulars of those orders, and our reasons, follow.

II. THE MISCONDUCT

[4] As a preliminary matter, we summarize here notable aspects of the factual background and our findings on the Respondents' misconduct, all taken from the Merits Decision.

[5] A collection of corporations and limited partnerships identified as the "Focused Life Group of Companies" (the **Focused Group**) was designed to participate in the "life settlement" industry in the United States. In this industry, future death benefits payable under a life insurance policy are sold to a buyer in exchange for an immediate payment to the person whose life is insured. The buyer expects a profit to the extent that the amount of the death benefits, when paid, exceeds the costs, including what was paid for the assignment of the benefits and the cost of premiums to keep the life insurance policy in good standing until payout.

[6] DeLaet had direct or indirect ownership positions in the various Focused Group entities, and was a director or officer (or both) of each. He was the controlling mind in all aspects of the activities of the Focused Group entities. Gitzel was a director or officer (or both) of several Focused Group entities, but was clearly subordinate to DeLaet. Gitzel's Focused Group activities were generally confined to what he termed "marketing".

[7] The Focused Group raised from the sale of securities to investors approximately $47 million over several years, $35 348 123 of that under four particular May 2007 or February 2008 offering memoranda (the **Impugned OMs**).

[8] Through the Impugned OMs, Focused Group marketing sessions and promotional material, potential investors were presented an apparently attractive investing opportunity. The Focused Group touted what it called a "Bonded Life Settlement" or "BLS" process (the **BLS Process**) for its life settlements business, under which:

- life insurance policies would be purchased only if issued by highly-rated insurers and with payout of death benefits expected, generally, within five years;
- purchase money would be paid through an escrow agent, which would not transfer the money until a particular policy was approved;
- the purchasing Focused Group entity would become "the owner of and the beneficiary under the policy";
- a "premium reserve account" would be set aside with sufficient money for the escrow agent to pay future premiums on the purchased life insurance policy; and
- the purchased life insurance policies would be backed by "reinsurance bonds" assuring a payment, within five years, of the amount of the death benefits, whether or not the insured person had died by then.

[9] Focused Group marketing material was highly promotional, repeatedly stressing the supposed quality and safety of an investment in Focused Group securities, with continued emphasis on the reinsurance bonding element.

[10] In reality, only one of 27 life insurance policies bought by the Focused Group was covered by a reinsurance bond. No returns were ever generated from Focused Group's investments in life settlements, although some investors received periodic payments for a time, totalling approximately $3.7 million. Focused Group did receive what DeLaet referred to as a "rebate commission" from the intermediary it used (an entity referred to as **American Settlements**). At least $600 000 of this rebate commission found its way to DeLaet; this money did not benefit Focused Group investors. There seemed to be no escrow arrangement, and Focused Group investor money came very quickly under the control of American Settlements. Focused Group entities seemed often either not to have become a beneficiary under the purchased life insurance policies, or to have become a beneficiary or partial beneficiary only after lengthy delay. Money was commingled, not placed in a premium reserve account with an escrow agent. In the result, at least one purchased insurance policy lapsed – presumably becoming worthless – when the required premiums went unpaid.

[11] Investor witnesses, as well as a Focused Group sales agent, testified consistently as to their understanding, from their dealings with Focused Group, that the offered investments would be both lucrative and safe. They proved to be neither. A number of the Focused Group entities are in bankruptcy, and investors have been left with significant losses.

[12] DeLaet and Gitzel each provided statements (the **DeLaet Statement** and the **Gitzel Statement**, respectively) admitting responsibility for numerous statements in the Impugned OMs and in other Focused Group promotional material that he reasonably ought to have known were – in material respects and at the time and in the circumstances in which they were made – misleading or untrue (or both) or omitted to state facts necessary to make the statements not misleading, and which would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value of the offered Focused Group securities. We found these admissions amply confirmed by the other evidence. The evidence also confirmed that DeLaet and Gitzel were responsible for certain representations made by Focused Group agents.

[13] In all, we found the disclosure given to Focused Group investors to have been extremely misleading. The discrepancies between the promises made and the reality, if known, would reasonably have been expected to affect significantly the price or value that a prospective investor would assign to the offered Focused Group securities – indeed, to have entirely dissuaded some investors from investing in Focused Group securities at all.

[14] We found that DeLaet's and Gitzel's direct misrepresentations, and their authorizing, permitting or acquiescing in misrepresentations being communicated to prospective investors by Focused Group and its sales agents, breached section 92(4.1) of the *Securities Act* (Alberta) (the **Act**) and were contrary to the public interest.

[15] We further determined that DeLaet had engaged in a clear, continuing and deliberate deceit, its purpose to obtain money from investors. We concluded that DeLaet had actual "subjective knowledge" both of the acts of deceit and of deprivation caused to investors by placing their pecuniary interests at risk. We therefore found that DeLaet had engaged in a course of conduct relating to Focused Group securities that he knew would perpetrate a fraud on the affected investors, contrary to section 93(b) of the Act and to the public interest.

III. APPROPRIATE ORDERS

A. The Law

1. Sanction Orders

[16] Our task is to determine what, if any, orders are appropriate to order against the Respondents under sections 198 and 199 of the Act.

[17] Sanction orders are intended to protect Alberta investors and the Alberta capital market by preventing future harm caused by a particular respondent (specific deterrence) or others who may be tempted to emulate the misconduct (general deterrence). The Supreme Court of Canada confirmed these principles as appropriate in *Committee for the Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v. Ontario (Securities Commission)*, 2001 SCC 37 at paras. 39-45; and *Re Cartaway Resources Corp.*, 2004 SCC 26 at paras. 52-62.

[18] In crafting appropriate sanctions, Commission panels keep those principles in mind while examining factors relevant in the particular circumstances, including (as set out in *Re Lamoureux,* [2002] A.S.C.D. No. 125 at para. 11 (affirmed on other grounds 2002 ABCA 253), as restated at para. 43 of *Re Workum and Hennig*, 2008 ABASC 719 (affirmed 2010 ABCA 405)):

- the seriousness of the findings against the respondent and the respondent's recognition of that seriousness;
- characteristics of the respondent, including capital market experience and activity and any prior sanctions;
- any benefits received by the respondent and any harm to which investors or the capital market generally were exposed by the misconduct found;
- the risk to investors and the capital market if the respondent were to continue to operate unimpeded in the capital market or if others were to emulate the respondent's conduct;
- decisions or outcomes in other matters; and
- any mitigating considerations.

[19] Each element of a sanction order is an important component of the appropriate overall sanction package. Categories of sanction orders sought often include, as here, capital-market bans and administrative penalties.

2. Costs Orders

[20] Costs orders, made under section 202 of the Act, serve a different purpose than do sanction orders. As stated in *Re Marcotte*, 2011 ABASC 287 at para. 20, a costs order is:

> . . . a means of recovering, from a respondent found to have engaged in capital-market misconduct, certain investigation and hearing costs that would otherwise be borne indirectly by law-abiding market participants whose fees fund the Commission's operations. It is generally appropriate that a respondent pay at least some portion of the relevant costs. Determination of the appropriate portion may involve assessing parties' contributions to the efficient conduct and ultimate resolution of the proceeding.

B. Positions of the Parties

1. Position of Staff

[21] Staff submitted that the following orders against the Respondents would be appropriate:

- against DeLaet: permanent trading and purchasing, use-of-exemptions and director-and-officer bans; a $1.5 million administrative penalty; and $40 000 in investigation and hearing costs; and
- against Gitzel: a 5-year trading and purchasing ban ("subject to appropriate carve-outs"); 10-year use-of-exemptions and director-and-officer bans; a $75 000 administrative penalty; and $5000 in investigation and hearing costs.

[22] In support of their position on costs, Staff tendered information indicating that Staff had incurred over $97 000 in investigation and hearing costs.

2. Position of DeLaet

[23] In his written submission for this phase of the proceeding, DeLaet essentially disputed our findings on the merits of the fraud allegation against him. Among other things, he asserted that he had been in a "no win situation" regarding bonding of purchased insurance policies and that the "underlying failure of [Focused] Money was caused by the fraudulent events of American Settlement[s]". DeLaet contended that American Settlements was "the ultimate party that caused the failure of Focused Money and [DeLaet] had nothing to do with their actions", conceding only that "greater care could have been taken in the management of investor funds and payments made to [American Settlements]". He also declared that he never intended to cause harm to investors.

[24] DeLaet stated that he is at present "financially destitute and with little opportunity to engage in gainful employment without retraining".

[25] To the extent that DeLaet addressed the actual purpose of this phase of the proceeding – the determination of whether, or what, orders are appropriate – his sole comment was the

generalized characterization of the sanctions sought by Staff as "unwarranted". He was silent concerning costs orders.

[26] To the extent that DeLaet sought a reconsideration or reversal of our findings on the merits of the allegations, we decline to do so. Those issues were fully canvassed, considered and determined as set out in the Merits Decision.

3. Position of Gitzel

[27] Gitzel did not dispute the substance of our findings in the Merits Decision, and accepted the responsibility we found him to bear as a corporate director, although he did express doubt that, given the manner in which the Focused Group operated, he could have detected earlier some of the misconduct relating to dealings in the United States.

[28] Nor did Gitzel take issue with the orders sought by Staff against him, except for what he perceived as an investor interest in modifying the effect of the director-and-officer ban sought by Staff against him. Specifically, his submission on this point centred on a real estate development project (the **Sundre Project**) involving certain land in or near Sundre, Alberta, identified in a 21 April 2010 joint venture agreement among parties including 1290569 Alberta Inc. (**129**) and 1531663 Alberta Inc. (**153**) – with both of which companies he is, or has been, a director. He indicated that money had been raised for this project from public investors, many of whom, he told us, were also Focused Group investors. Concurrent with troubles at Focused Group, this separate venture also met difficulties. However, in Gitzel's view the Sundre Project can now again go forward, with the participation of a reputable and independent developer. Gitzel would continue to be involved in such aspects as obtaining permits and approvals – with which he had been involved from the outset – and selling lots once developed. Gitzel indicated that it would be unhelpful to Sundre Project public investors were he denied the ability to continue his involvement in the venture – and, indeed, it was his view that it was the specific wish of all but one investor that he remain closely involved. To that end – and without specifying precisely what duties of a director or officer his participation would entail – Gitzel effectively sought a limited carve-out from the director-and officer ban sought by Staff.

[29] Gitzel did not address costs orders.

C. Are Sanctions in the Public Interest?

[30] We here analyze the facts and circumstances in light of key sanctioning principles and factors discussed above, dealing in turn with each of the two Respondents.

1. Seriousness of Misconduct and Recognition of Seriousness

[31] We concluded in the Merits Decision that DeLaet and Gitzel were responsible for "extremely misleading" misrepresentations made to Alberta investors, by the respective Respondents directly and by their authorizing, permitting or acquiescing in misrepresentations by Focused Group entities and sales agents. This was clearly serious misconduct. Gitzel's lesser role and the fact that he was lulled and misled by DeLaet did not diminish or excuse the seriousness of Gitzel's misconduct.

[32] We further found that DeLaet engaged in a course of conduct that he knew would perpetrate a fraud on investors, "lied and knew he was lying" and engaged in "a clear, continuing

and deliberate deceit, its purpose to obtain money from investors". This, too, was clearly serious misconduct – fraud being, as this Commission stated in *Re Reeves*, 2011 ABASC 107 (at para. 22) "the most serious of securities regulatory misconduct".

[33] Given the seriousness of Gitzel's and, especially, DeLaet's misconduct, this factor calls for significant sanctions against both Respondents.

[34] As Staff acknowledged, both the DeLaet Statement and the Gitzel Statement indicated some degree of recognition of the seriousness of their respective misrepresentation-related misconduct.

[35] Moreover, it was clear to us from Gitzel's conduct and submissions in both phases of the hearing that he appreciated the seriousness of his misconduct and the harm thereby done to investors. He is, in our view, genuinely contrite. This argues for considerable moderation of the sanction that might otherwise be necessary to deliver public protection.

[36] DeLaet is a different story.

[37] DeLaet's submissions in this phase of the proceeding, outlined above, were entirely consistent with the position he took in the Merits Hearing and, indeed, with the manner in which he managed the Focused Group and its securities-selling operation. DeLaet did make the generalized admission "that greater care could have been taken" – by whom, he did not specify – "in the management of investor funds and payments made" to American Settlements (the main provider with which he chose to deal). However, DeLaet consistently portrayed himself – and, we believe, perceives himself – as primarily a victim. According to DeLaet, everything that went wrong was someone else's fault: the furnisher of the one reinsurance bond he bought acted fraudulently; American Settlements acted fraudulently; and even the Commission itself denied a Focused Group entity the "opportunity to restructure itself" (because an interim cease trade order barred continued sales of securities by DeLaet and that entity, thus preventing new investors and new money from being drawn into the debacle).

[38] As to DeLaet's own actions, he spoke only to justifying his decision not to purchase reinsurance bonds. He reiterated his position from the Merits Hearing that he was authorized to make that decision, and did so to avoid wasting investors' money because the bonds turned out to be of concern and ultimately worthless – he did not "know of any [such] bond ever paying out for life settlement policies" (from either his chosen provider or any other).

[39] Be that as it may, and accepting (as the evidence suggests) that American Settlements and that reinsurance-bond provider both behaved unacceptably, DeLaet still made no comment about the issue that lay at the heart of our findings on fraud: the vast divergence, known to DeLaet, between the promises made to existing and prospective Focused Group investors, and how the operation was actually run. Notably, he did not use reinsurance bonds, escrow or other elements of the BLS Process that he had touted as the basis of the supposed safety of the Focused Group investments.

[40] It is clear to us that DeLaet does not "get it". He failed completely to acknowledge his responsibility for the harm done to investors through his deceit. We can only conclude that he does not himself, even now, recognize that harm and his causal role. This factor bolsters the need for significant protective sanctions against DeLaet.

2. Characteristics and History of the Respondents

[41] Gitzel and DeLaet both had experience with companies and in the financial sector. Although there was no indication that either of them had ever been previously sanctioned by any securities regulatory authority, their corporate and financial-sector backgrounds should have made them aware of the responsibilities they so cardinally failed to fulfil at the Focused Group.

[42] On balance, this factor supports significant sanction against both Respondents.

3. Benefits Received by Respondents and Harm Done

[43] Both Respondents were rewarded financially from their involvement with the Focused Group and their associated misconduct. Between 2006 and 2009 DeLaet received at least $2.4 million by way of compensation and other payments, among them a dubious $600 000 purported shareholder loan which had appearances of "kickbacks" from American Settlements. In the same period Gitzel received at least $300 000 in various forms of compensation.

[44] Focused Group raised some $47 million from the investing public, over $35 million of that through the Impugned OMs. As noted, no returns have been generated from Focused Group's life settlement investments, although some Focused Group investors did receive payments totalling approximately $3.7 million. With Focused Group entities now bankrupt, prospects of further recovery appear bleak. There has clearly been direct and substantial financial harm to identifiable investors. They, and others who learn of their experience – suffering losses through misrepresentations and fraud – may well lose confidence in the capital market. Consequent reluctance to invest may impede the ability of legitimate businesses to raise money in the capital market, particularly in the prospectus-exempt market where this misconduct occurred. Harm to the reputation and efficiency of the capital market generally is foreseeable.

[45] These factors call for significant sanctions against both Respondents, in particular against DeLaet.

4. Risk of Future Harm – Need for Specific and General Deterrence

[46] Gitzel, in our view, poses some risk of future harm because of his demonstrated failures in a capital-raising enterprise. We do not consider him currently fit to raise money in the capital market. Although significantly ameliorated by his mentioned recognition of the seriousness of his misconduct and contrition for the harm done, a risk remains. This factor calls for protective sanctions against him, moderated but not insignificant.

[47] As to DeLaet, his key role in the misconduct found against him is much aggravated by his failure to recognize its seriousness, as discussed. We conclude that he presents a clear, current and continuing threat to investors and the capital market – and that, unless tightly and permanently constrained, he would remain a danger.

5. Other Decisions

[48] We were referred by Staff to several decisions of this Commission in other proceedings. While differences in the circumstances of each case much diminish their usefulness as a guide to sanctioning, we note a consistent theme that serious misconduct causing significant harm – thus indicating a greater need for protective and preventive measures – will attract serious consequences, often in the form of bans on access to the capital market coupled with direct monetary orders.

[49] This, too, is such a case. Significant market-access restrictions and monetary orders are appropriate against both Respondents here as well.

6. Mitigating Considerations

[50] We discern three important mitigating considerations in respect of Gitzel – (i) his lesser role in the misconduct, (ii) his recognition of the seriousness of his misconduct, and (iii) his contrition for the resulting harm. These call for substantial moderation of the sanctions that would otherwise be appropriate.

[51] As noted, DeLaet suggested that blame for what transpired lay elsewhere, and that he was himself a victim, harmed reputationally and financially. However, we do not accept any of these claims as mitigating the misconduct or the harm done. We have addressed elsewhere the import of DeLaet's recognition of the seriousness of his misrepresentation-related misconduct. In the result, we discern no mitigating considerations in relation to DeLaet.

7. Conclusion on Factors

[52] For the reasons given, we conclude that significant sanctions, delivering both specific and general deterrence – thus public protection – are appropriate against DeLaet and, to a lesser but not insignificant extent, against Gitzel. In the circumstances, appropriate sanction against each Respondent must combine market-access bans and direct monetary orders.

D. Appropriate Sanctions

[53] We are satisfied that the specific orders sought by Staff against each Respondent would provide the requisite protection and deterrence and would be in the public interest.

[54] Given our observations and findings – in both phases of this proceeding – we consider that the scale of DeLaet's misconduct – which included perpetrating a fraud in the capital market – and the continuing threat he poses call for nothing less than his permanent removal from access to the Alberta capital market in key capacities. We further consider that the quantum of administrative penalty sought against him by Staff fairly and appropriately recognizes the factors analyzed above and would form an essential element of the deterrence here required.

[55] We will therefore make the orders sought by Staff against DeLaet.

[56] Concerning Gitzel, we similarly consider that the scope of the orders sought against him – the durations of the various proposed market-access bans and the quantum of the proposed administrative penalty – appropriately reflect the circumstances and would, in combination,

deliver the requisite deterrence and protection. Indeed, as mentioned, Gitzel generally took no issue with Staff's position.

[57] That said, we are sympathetic to Gitzel's request that any orders we make not preclude him from assisting public investors to recoup money invested toward the Sundre Project. While success in that venture is not assured, we conclude that a limited carve-out from a director-and-officer ban, embodying reasonable boundaries, would enable Gitzel and others associated with or interested in the Sundre Project to work toward a positive outcome for those investors. We do not consider that such a carve-out would undermine the deterrent (thus protective) effect, or otherwise diminish the overall efficacy, of the package of sanctions under consideration.

[58] Accordingly, we will permit Gitzel, despite the restrictions otherwise inherent in a director-and-officer ban, to act in either or both such capacities with 129 or 153 (or both) with a view to moving the Sundre Project forward so as to generate funds for the benefit of public investors in that project, provided that such efforts do not involve trading in securities or raising money from the investing public.

[59] We will therefore make the orders sought by Staff against Gitzel, modified by the just-mentioned carve-out.

E. Costs

[60] Staff provided a document setting out costs of the investigation and hearing, totalling over $97 000. Staff submitted that any costs orders made should recognize the hearing efficiencies realized through the DeLaet and Gitzel Statements. However, Staff also noted that DeLaet made no admissions relating to the fraud allegations, which were sustained. In all these circumstances, Staff contended that appropriate costs orders would total $45 000 – $40 000 against DeLaet and $5000 against Gitzel.

[61] After reviewing Staff's claimed costs and considering the Respondents' contributions to the efficiency of the hearing of this matter, we conclude that the amount and apportionment of costs suggested by Staff is fair. Therefore, DeLaet is to pay $40 000 in costs and Gitzel is to pay $5000 in costs.

IV. CONCLUSION

A. Sanction and Costs Orders

[62] For the reasons given, we make the following orders.

DeLaet

[63] Against DeLaet, we order that:

- under sections 198(1)(b) and (c) of the Act, he must cease trading in or purchasing any securities or exchange contracts, and all of the exemptions contained in Alberta securities laws do not apply to him, permanently;
- under sections 198(1)(d) and (e), he must resign any position that he currently holds as a director or officer of any issuer, and he is prohibited from becoming or acting as a director or officer (or both) of any issuer, permanently;

- under section 199, he must pay an administrative penalty of $1.5 million; and
- under section 202, he must pay $40 000 of the costs of the investigation and hearing.

<u>Gitzel</u>
[64] Against Gitzel, we order that:

- under section 198(1)(b) of the Act, he must cease trading in or purchasing any securities or exchange contracts, for 5 years, except that these orders do not preclude him from trading in or purchasing securities or exchange contracts through a registrant (who has first been given a copy of this decision) in RRSPs and RESPs for the benefit of one or more of himself, his spouse and dependent children;
- under section 198(1)(c), all of the exemptions contained in Alberta securities laws do not apply to him, for 10 years, except that these orders do not preclude him from trading in or purchasing securities or exchange contracts through a registrant (who has first been given a copy of this decision) in RRSPs and RESPs for the benefit of one or more of himself, his spouse and dependent children;
- under sections 198(1)(d) and (e), he must resign any position that he currently holds as a director or officer of any issuer, and he is prohibited from becoming or acting as a director or officer (or both) of any issuer, for 10 years, except that these orders do not preclude him from acting as a director or officer (or both) of 129 or 153 (or both) for the purpose of moving the Sundre Project forward so as to generate funds for the benefit of public investors in that project, provided that such efforts do not involve trading in securities or raising money from the investing public;
- under section 199, he must pay an administrative penalty of $75 000; and
- under section 202, he must pay $5000 of the costs of the investigation and hearing.

B. Interim Order Revoked and Related Application Dismissed

[65] The Commission on 23 December 2009 issued an interim cease trade order against Focused Money Solutions Inc. (**Focused Money**, an entity within the Focused Group which was identified in the Impugned OMs as promoter) and DeLaet (the **Interim Order**, cited as *Re Focused Money Solutions Inc.*, 2009 ABASC 638). The Interim Order was twice extended (by *Re Focused Money Solutions Inc.*, 2010 ABASC 6 and *Re Focused Money Solutions Inc.*, 2010 ABASC 74) and remains in effect.

[66] On 28 June 2012 DeLaet made application to the Commission for what amounted to a variation of the Interim Order (the **DeLaet Application**). The DeLaet Application was heard by a Commission panel but no conclusion reached; it was anticipated that DeLaet might make further submissions or withdraw the DeLaet Application. Neither occurred. While it appears that DeLaet abandoned the DeLaet Application, such was never formally documented.

[67] Inasmuch as the Interim Order was prompted by concerns about capital market activity that led ultimately to the present proceeding and the orders issued above against DeLaet and Gitzel, we conclude that the purpose of the Interim Order has been served. Considering that it would not be prejudicial to the public interest, we therefore order under section 214(1) of the Act that the Interim Order is now revoked.

[68] With the Interim Order at an end, the DeLaet Application is moot, and it is dismissed accordingly.

C. Proceeding Concluded

[69] This proceeding is concluded.

For the Commission:

27 May 2013

"original signed by"
Glenda Campbell, QC

"original signed by"
Dan McKinley, FCA

"original signed by"
Stephen Murison